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Product Liability
by Franklin P. Brannen, Jr.*
and Jacob E. Daly"
This Article surveys developments in Georgia product liability law
between June 1, 2009 through May 31, 2010.' It covers noteworthy
cases decided during this period by the Georgia appellate courts, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the United
States district courts located in Georgia.
I. FAILURE TO WARN
Existence of a Duty
"In failure to warn cases, the duty to warn arises whenever the
manufacturer knows or reasonably should know of the danger arising
The manufacturer has constructive
from the use of its product.'
knowledge if "by the application of reasonable, developed human skill
and foresight," it should have known of the danger.' The plaintiff bears
the burden of proving that the manufacturer has actual or constructive

A.

* Counsel in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University (B.A.,
1992); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1996).
Member, State Bars of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida.
** Of Counsel in the firm of Freeman, Mathis & Gary, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Virginia (B.A., 1993); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law
(J.D., cum laude, 2000). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For analysis of Georgia product liability law during the prior survey period, see
Franklin P. Brannen, Jr. & Jacob E. Daly, Product Liability, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 61 MERCER L. REV. 267 (2009).
2. Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723, 724,450 S.E.2d 208,211(1994); see also Ford
Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 171 Ga. App. 331, 335,319 S.E.2d 470, 476 (1984) (holding that
"the manufacturer of a product which, to its actual or constructive knowledge, involves
danger to users, has a duty to give warning of such danger"). A seller may also owe a duty
to warn under certain limited circumstances. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brannan Auto Parts,
Inc., 231 Ga. App. 353, 355, 498 S.E.2d 583, 585 (1998) (en banc).
3. Bishop v. Farhat, 227 Ga. App. 201, 206, 489 S.E.2d 323, 328 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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knowledge of the danger,' and this burden may be satisfied with
evidence of prior complaints or injuries, documentation of the danger in
relevant literature, recognition of the danger by industry experts, or
alerts issued by relevant governmental agencies.6 But even if the
manufacturer has actual or constructive knowledge of a danger
associated with its product, it does not have a duty to warn users if that
danger is open and obvious.6 Thus, the existence of a duty "depends
upon [the] foreseeability of the use in question, the type of danger
involved, and the foreseeability of the user's knowledge of the danger."'
The manufacturer's knowledge of the alleged danger was the central
issue in Mather v. L'Oreal USA, Inc.' The plaintiff used IOreal Paris
Sublime Bronze self-tanning lotion twice a day for three days while she
was vacationing at a beach. During that time she did not experience
any problems, but while she was driving home, her skin became red with
small pustules when it was exposed to direct sunlight through the
windows of her car. Once she got home, her symptoms became
progressively worse. She developed pus-filled abscesses that turned into
a systemic infection, and she had to be given IV antibiotics. Lesions
appeared all over her body, and her multiple sclerosis was exacerbated.
She sued L'Oreal, the manufacturer of the lotion, alleging that it failed
to warn her about the potential dangers of using the product. The
manufacturer moved for summary judgment, and trial court granted the
motion. 9
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the
manufacturer had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the
allergic reaction experienced by the plaintiff.o The plaintiff first
argued that the manufacturer knew about this danger because its own
expert testified that the active ingredient in the lotion, hydroxyacetone,
is generally accepted by dermatologists as safe for most people to use.
Because the expert said "most" and not "all," the plaintiff argued that
the lotion should have had a warning since it was not safe for some
people to use." The court rejected this argument based on comment j

4. John Crane, Inc. v. Wommack, 227 Ga. App. 538, 540, 489 S.E.2d 527, 530 (1997).
5. Bishop, 227 Ga. App. at 206, 489 S.E.2d at 328. These are by no means the only
ways of proving the manufacturer's actual or constructive knowledge.
6. Vickery v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 249 Ga. App. 659, 661, 549 S.E.2d 482, 484 (2001).
7. Battersby v. Boyer, 241 Ga. App. 115, 117, 526 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1999) (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. 304 Ga. App. 163, 695 S.E.2d 693 (2010).
9. Id. at 163-64, 695 S.E.2d at 694.
10. Id at 165, 695 S.E.2d at 695.
11. Id. at 164, 695 S.E.2d at 695.
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to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts," which provides
as follows:
The seller may reasonably assume that those with common allergies,
as for example to eggs or strawberries, will be aware of them, and he
is not required to warn against them. Where, however, the product
contains an ingredient to which a substantialnumber of the population
are allergic, and the ingredient is one whose danger is not generally
known, or if known is one which the consumer would reasonably not
expect to find in the product, the seller is required to give warning
against it, if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable,
developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge, of the
presence of the ingredient and the danger."
The plaintiff was unable to satisfy this standard because "there [was] no
evidence that the product contained an ingredient to which a substantial
number of the population is allergic, rather, just the opposite.""'
Next, the plaintiff attempted to satisfy her burden of proving the
manufacturer's knowledge by arguing that the manufacturer improperly
excluded certain people during its testing of the lotion. The manufacturer excluded people who had an illness that contraindicated participation,
who had certain skin conditions, and who were using medications that
could either affect the skin's tolerance of the lotion or enhance or
suppress adverse effects of the lotion. What the plaintiff failed to
answer, however, was that it would have been unethical for the
manufacturer to have included these people. Finally, the plaintiff
contended that the manufacturer knew or should have known about the
danger because of problems experienced by testing participants and
consumers. During testing, seven out of forty-two people who had
However, the court
sensitive skin reported an adverse event.'6
disregarded the reactions experienced by these seven people because
they "were characterized as 'mild' and ...

in no way resembled the

reaction experienced by [the plaintiffl."l6 After testing, the manufacturer received six complaints from consumers who had used the lotion, but
the court held that these complaints did not satisfy the plaintiff's burden
because "[there were no complaints of any reaction of the type

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 164-65, 695 S.E.2d at 695.
RESTATEMENT (SECoND) oF TORTS §402A cmt. j (1965) (emphasis added).
Mather, 304 Ga. App. at 165, 695 S.E.2d at 695.
Id.
Id.
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experienced by [the plaintiff]."n Accordingly, the court held that the
manufacturer was entitled to summary judgment."8
The open and obvious nature of the alleged danger was at issue in
Cochran v. Brinkmann Corp." The plaintiffs' son sustained severe
burns when he knocked over a turkey fryer and hot peanut oil spilled
onto his back. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the turkey
fryer was defective, unfit for use, inherently dangerous, and lacked
adequate warnings. The manufacturer moved for summary judgment,
and as to its alleged failure to warn, it argued that it did not owe a duty
to warn because the dangers associated with the turkey fryer were open
and obvious.o Noting that the plaintiffs did not contend that the
dangers of using a turkey fryer were latent, the court agreed with the
manufacturer and held that "[tihe dangers associated with the turkey
fryer here are inherent, objectively open and obvious, and no reasonable
jury could conclude otherwise, nor would they require a warning for the
obvious danger at issue in this case."

B. Causation
Proximate cause is an essential element of a failure-to-warn claim.2 2
Many failure-to-warn claims are improper as a matter of law because the
plaintiff failed to read the available warnings, which means that
additional warnings would not have altered the plaintiffs conduct that
resulted in the injuries at issue in the lawsuit.
This shortcoming was present in Mascarenasv. Cooper Tfre & Rubber
Co., a lawsuit in which the plaintiffs sued both the tire manufacturer
and the vehicle manufacturer for an allegedly defective tire that
ruptured and caused the rollover of a sport-utility vehicle.2' In their
failure-to-warn claim against the SUV manufacturer, the plaintiffs
contended that the sun visor warning in the SUV "did not mention the
stability and handling/skate risks posed by the automobile at all."'
But the driver of the SUV admitted that she did not read the owner's

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. No. 1:08-cv-1790-WSD, 2009 WL 4823854 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 9, 2009).
20. Id. at *2-3, *7.
21. Id. at *7; see also Biles v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 1:95-CV-777WBH, 1996 WL
684134, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 21, 1996) (holding "that the danger of cooking food in hot oil
over an open flame is plainly an open and obvious danger and that a reasonable jury could
not conclude otherwise").
22. Powell v. Harsco Corp., 209 Ga. App. 348, 349-50, 433 S.E.2d 608, 609-10 (1993).
23. 643 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (S.D. Ga. 2009).
24. Id. at 1367.
25. Id. at 1374-75.
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manual that accompanied the SUV, and she could not remember
whether she had read the sun visor warning label on the subject vehicle
or on a different vehicle. 6
The district court held that the driver's failure to read the sun visor
warning barred her failure-to-warn claim as a matter of law.27 The
plaintiffs were "not challenging the adequacy of [the manufacturer's]
efforts to communicate the warning, just the warning itself."28 Because
the driver did not read the available warnings, there was no evidence in
the record that additional warnings would have changed the driver's
conduct. 29 Accordingly, the plaintiffs failed to show that the absence of
the additional warnings was the proximate cause of the underlying
accident. 0
In Silverstein v. Proctor& Gamble Manufacturing Co.,3 the plaintiffs
contended that their use of Crest Pro-Health Rinse mouthwash caused
a decrease in their ability to taste food. In addition, the plaintiffs
claimed that the mouthwash stained their teeth and tongue. The
plaintiffs brought a failure-to-warn claim against the mouthwash
manufacturer, alleging that the label did not adequately warn consumers
of the harms that could result from the use of the product.3 2 As part
of a motion for summary judgment, the manufacturer argued that the
failure-to-warn claim should be dismissed because the plaintiffs failed
to read the available warnings." The plaintiffs countered that their
recovery should not be barred because they were "challenging the
adequacy of the efforts of the manufacturer to communicate the dangers
Relying on precedent from the
of the product to the consumer."'
Eleventh Circuit, the district court concluded that because the plaintiffs
did not read the warning label, any inadequacy of the warning label
could not have been the proximate cause of their injuries." The court
distinguished the facts here from those in Rhodes v. Interstate Battery
System of America, Inc.' on the ground that the plaintiff in that case
could not read the warning label because there was insufficient light."

26. Id. at 1375.

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

700 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Ga. 2009).
Id. at 1315.
Id. at 1321.
Id.
Id. (citing Thornton v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 22 F.3d 284,289-90 (1994)).
722 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1984).
Silverstein, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 1321 (citing Rhodes, 722 F.2d at 1520).

248

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

Instead, the court found these facts to be akin to the facts in Thornton
v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.,' in which the plaintiff had an
opportunity to read the warning label but chose not to read the
warnings." Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment
for the defendant on this issue."'
In Swicegood v. Pliva, Inc.," the plaintiff brought suit against two
pharmaceutical companies because she contended her ingestion of their
medication metoclopramide, the generic form of Reglan, caused her to
develop tardive dyskinesia, a medical disorder that produces involuntary
The plaintiff's claims against the defendants
muscle contractions.
that
they failed to warn of the risk that this
included an allegation
medical condition could develop through the use of the medication."
As part of their summary judgment motion, the manufacturers
contended that the plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim should be dismissed
because the prescribing doctor never reviewed the warning label for the
defendants' generic medicine. Instead, the doctor testified that he only
read the warning label for Reglan, the name-brand drug. The defendants argued that because the doctor did not read their label, any
actions or inactions by them in their design of the label could not be the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries." But the district court held
that because the warning label for a generic medicine is generally
identical to the warning label for the name-brand version, it was a fact
issue for the jury to decide whether the prescribing doctor became aware
Accordingly, the
of any changes to the generic medication label.'
defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on this issue."
C. Failureto Recall
Many failure-to-warn claims are based on the manufacturer's alleged
failure to warn the purchaser at the time of sale about a danger
associated with the product, but a failure-to-warn claim can also be
based on the manufacturer's alleged failure to warn the purchaser about
a danger that it discovers after the sale.4 ' Thus, a manufacturer may

38. 22 F.3d 284 (11th Cir. 1994).
39. Silverstein, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 1321.
40. Id. at 1322.
41. No. 1:07-CV-1671-TWT, 2010 WL 1138455 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2010).
42. Id. at *1.
43. Id. at *3.
44. Id. at *4.
45. Id
46. Id.
47. Victor Schwartz, The Post-SaleDuty to Warn: Two UnfortunateForks in the Road
to a ReasonableDoctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 892, 892-93, 894 (1983).
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owe a point-of-sale duty to warn and a post-sale duty to warn." A duty
to recall a product and a post-sale duty to warn about its dangers are
not the same, but they are similar insofar as each arises after the
product is sold, and a recall notice is essentially an extremely strong
warning.
Most courts have held that manufacturers do not have a duty to recall
a product that is found to have a defect after the initial sale, unless the
government orders a recall.' The rationale for refusing to impose a
duty to recall is that "[a] product's design generally has been evaluated
as of the time of manufacture" and that "[eixpanding a manufacturer's
duty in this manner is analogous to a retroactive judgment about
product design."so This is an important point that seems to get lost in
the debate, but the Michigan Supreme Court explained it well in Gregory
v. Cincinnati,Inc. 1 If the product contains a defect that the manufacturer is not aware of at the time of sale but subsequently discovers, the
manufacturer may have a post-sale duty to warn about the defect."
Proponents of a duty to recall, however, argue that the manufacturer
should be required to recall a product that was not defective at the time
of sale but that became "defective" because of improvements in
technology after that time.' This argument is inconsistent with the
general rule that a manufacturer's liability depends on whether the
product was defective at the time of sale and that "a manufacturer is
under no duty to modify its product in accordance with the current state
of the art safety features."" Moreover, public policy considerations
weigh against imposing a duty to recall on manufacturers:
The imposition of post-sale tort law obligations that include the duty
to remedy or replace products already in the marketplace has
significant implications. Attorneys who counsel manufacturers about
how to fulfill their obligations and avoid liability must inform them
that by developing new and safer products they may be exposed to
liability for harm caused by an older product made and sold before the
safety improvements were developed. This advice may discourage the
very conduct society seeks to foster. Progress and innovation should

48. Id. at 893.
49. Lisa Anne Meyer, Annotation, Products Liability: Manufacturer's Posteale
Obligation to Modi, Repair, or Recall Product, 47 A.L.R.5TH 395, 405 (1997 & Supp.
2010); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11(aXl) (1997).
50. Schwartz, supra note 47, at 900.
51. 538 N.W.2d 325 (1995).
52. Id. at 329.
53. Id. at 330.
54. Id. at 336-37.
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not be penalized by attaching to them a duty to go out into the
marketplace to find and fix old products.
Furthermore, courts that impose a post-sale obligation to remedy or
replace products already in the marketplace arrogate to themselves a
power equivalent to that of requiring product recall. Product recalls,
however, are properly the province of administrative agencies, as the
federal statutes that expressly delegate recall authority to various
agencies suggest. As Congress has recognized, administrative agencies
have the institutional resources to make fully informed assessments of
the marginal benefits of recalling a specific product. Because the cost
of locating, recalling, and replacing mass-marketed products can be
enormous and will likely be passed on to consumers in the form of
higher prices, the recall power should not be exercised without
extensive consideration of its economic impact. Courts, however, are
constituted to define individual cases, and their inquiries are confined
to the particular facts and arguments in the cases before them.
Decisions to expand a manufacturer's post-sale duty beyond making
reasonable efforts to warn product users about newly discovered
dangers should be left to administrative agencies, which are better able
to weigh the costs and benefits of such action."
Prior to the survey period, the existence of a duty to recall was
unsettled in Georgia. In 1988 the Georgia Court of Appeals held in
Blossman Gas Co. v. Williams' "that when a dealer voluntarily agrees
to notify its customers of a product recall and to mail notices provided
by the manufacturer, . . . its negligence in failing to perform this

obligation will give rise to a cause of action to one who suffers injuries
as a proximate result thereof." The court noted that "the dealer is not
obligated to conduct the recall program" but that "once it undertakes to
do so a duty devolves upon the dealer to exercise ordinary care."58 Five
years later, in Mack T-ucks, Inc. v. Conkle," the Georgia Supreme
Court noted that the jury had found for the plaintiffs on their claim for
negligent failure to recall or warn, but the issue on appeal did not
involve the validity of that claim.' In 2001 the court of appeals held
in Smith v. Ontario Sewing Machine Co."' that "[wlhen the manufacturer subsequently learns that its products have been sold with
dangerous defects, it is under a duty to recall the product from the

55. Schwartz, supra note 47, at 900-01 (footnotes omitted).
56. 189 Ga. App. 195, 375 S.E.2d 117 (1988) (physical precedent).
57. Id. at 198, 375 S.E.2d at 120.
58. Id.
59. 263 Ga. 539, 436 S.E.2d 635 (1993).
60. Id. at 539-40, 436 S.E.2d at 636-37.
61. 249 Ga. App. 364, 548 S.E.2d 89 (2001) (physical precedent), affd on othergrounds,

Ontario Sewing Mach. Co. v. Smith, 275 Ga. 683, 572 S.E.2d 533 (2002).
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market and to remedy the defect or replace the product in some cases in
the exercise of ordinary care." The manufacturer in Smith appealed,
and although the supreme court disapproved of the court of appeals
holding on this issue, it found that there was no need to resolve this
issue because the only issue on appeal related to proximate cause.'
Thus, the existence of a duty to recall was an open question following
the supreme court's decision in Smith.
The court of appeals provided a definitive answer to this question
during the survey period. In Ford Motor Co. v. Reese," the plaintiffs'
mother died as a result of a rear-impact collision between the car she
was driving, a 1994 Ford Tempo, and a dump truck. The plaintiffs
alleged that their mother sustained more severe injuries than she
otherwise would have because the impact caused the seatback to collapse
rearward so that her head and shoulders struck the rear seat, which
caused a spinal fracture and fatal injuries to her head and brain. The
plaintiffs sued Ford for, among other things, negligent failure to recall
the seatback. At trial the plaintiffs' experts testified that the seatback
was defectively designed and that Ford could have warned drivers about
the potential risk of seatback collapse upon rear impact. The plaintiffs'
experts also testified that Ford could have used an alternative seat
design that was safer or could have retrofitted the Tempo with a safer
seat through a recall campaign. According to the plaintiffs' experts,
either of these alternatives would have prevented the injuries to and
death of the plaintiffs' mother. Ford countered with expert testimony of
its own, which showed that the design of the seatback was reasonable
and consistent with the prevailing state of the art and industry
standards at the time of its manufacture and that the seatback protected
occupants better than other types of seatbacks in most collisions. After
the close of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury with respect
to a claim for negligent failure to warn or recall. The jury then returned
a verdict for the plaintiffs.'
On appeal, Ford argued that the trial court erred by instructing the
jury about a claim for negligent failure to recall because Georgia law
does not impose a duty to recall on manufacturers." The court of
appeals agreed and held "that absent special circumstances, no common
law duty exists under Georgia law requiring a manufacturer to recall a

62. Id. at 368, 548 S.E.2d at 95.
63. Ontario Sewing Mach. Co. v. Smith, 275 Ga. 683, 685-86, 572 S.E.2d 533, 535
(2002).
64. 300 Ga. App. 82, 684 S.E.2d 279 (2009).
65. Id. at 82-84, 684 S.E.2d at 282-83.
66. Id. at 84, 684 S.E.2d at 283.
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product after the product has left the manufacturer's control."' The
court explained that "a manufacturer's duty to implement alternative
safer designs is limited to the time the product is manufactured, not
months or years later when technology or knowledge may have
changed."' And although Georgia law recognizes a post-sale duty to
warn, this continuing duty does not encompass a duty to recall.'
Finally, the court noted that its decision was consistent with the
Restatement and the majority of other jurisdictions that have considered
this issue and that public policy concerns favor administrative agencies
making recall decisions rather than courts." Accordingly, the court
held that the trial court's jury instructions were harmful error and that
Ford was entitled to a new trial." The plaintiffs filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari with the supreme court, but the supreme court denied
their petition in a 4-3 decision."
Reese is a good decision not because it put Georgia in line with most
other states and the Restatement but rather because it adheres to
fundamental principles of Georgia product liability law. As the court of
appeals recognized in Reese, a manufacturer is entitled to have the
design and safety of its product judged as of the time of manufacture.
"Any other rule would render a manufacturer a perpetual insurer of the
safety of its products, contrary to established Georgia law."7 As the
Michigan Supreme Court explained in Gregory,a decision about whether
a product should be recalled should not be left to judges and juries but
rather to administrative agencies that have the experience, expertise,
and resources necessary to weigh the costs and benefits of a recall."

67. Id. at 85, 684 S.E.2d at 283-84 (footnote omitted). The court noted, however, that
a federal or state statute or governmental agency may require a manufacturer to recall a
product, which would impose a duty, and that a manufacturer must exercise ordinary care
in conducting a recall campaign if it chooses to recall a product voluntarily. Id. at 85 n.2,
684 S.E.2d at 284 n.2.
68. Id. at 85, 684 S.E.2d at 284.
69. Id. at 85-86, 684 S.E.2d at 284.
70. Id. at 86-87, 684 S.E.2d 284-85.
71. Id. at 87-88, 684 S.E.2d at 285.
72. Reese v. Ford Motor Co., No. S10C0186, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 161, at *1 (Ga. Feb. 8,
2010). Information about the plaintiffs' petition and the supreme court's denial is available
on the supreme court's website at http*//www.gasupreme.us/docket-search/resultsone.
record.php?caseNumber=810C0186.
73. 300 Ga. App. at 85, 684 S.E.2d at 284.
74. Id.
75. 538 N.W.2d at 334.
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PROXVIATE CAUSE

Asbestos Litigation

Proof that a manufacturer's product proximately caused the plaintiff's
injuries is an essential element of all product liability claims regardless
of whether the plaintiff is proceeding under a strict liability or negligence theory." Proving proximate cause is particularly problematic in
asbestos litigation because "of the length of time between exposure and
perceived injury and the migratory nature of much of the employment
involving asbestos exposure." 7 Such problems, however, do not justify
easing an asbestos plaintiff's burden of proof."' After all, "[a] manufacturer has the absolute right to have his strict liability [or negligence] for
injuries adjudged on the basis of the design of his own marketed product
and not that of someone else." Thus, to prove proximate cause in an
asbestos case, "the plaintiff must present evidence that a particular
defendant's asbestos-containing product was used at the job site and that
the plaintiff was in proximity to that product at the time it was being
used.""
Because asbestos-related diseases, such as mesothelioma, can have
latency periods of several decades, this is a difficult burden to satisfy
since memories fade and witnesses disappear or die.8" The plaintiff
may be able to satisfy this burden with his own testimony, but if he
cannot do so, he may offer testimony from a coworker who has personal
knowledge of the plaintiffs use of a particular manufacturer's asbestoscontaining product or who used a particular manufacturer's asbestoscontaining product in the same vicinity as the plaintiff." It is not
enough for the plaintiff to prove only that he worked at a place where
asbestos-containing products were used; no presumption of exposure
arises under those circumstances." Instead, proof of exposure to a
particular manufacturer's asbestos-containing product is required
76. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(bXl) (Supp. 2010); Hoffman v. AC&S, Inc., 248 Ga. App. 608,
610, 548 S.E.2d 379, 382 (2001).
77. Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480,1486 (11th Cir. 1985).
78. Id. at 1485.
79. Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 135, 279 S.E.2d 264, 269 (1981).
80. Hoffman, 248 Ga. App. at 611, 548 S.E.2d at 382 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
81. Blackston, 764 F.2d at 1486 (noting that the requirement of proving exposure to a
particular manufacturer's asbestos-containing product "sets a standard that is difficult to
meet").
82. Hoffman, 248 Ga. App. at 611, 548 S.E.2d at 382-83.
83. Blackston, 764 F.2d at 1483-85.

254

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

because guesses or speculation that raise only a possibility of such
exposure are insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's burden.' Without
this proof, manufacturers of asbestos-containing products would
essentially be liable on a market-share or industrywide basis.'
Georgia law, however, does not permit market-share or industrywide
liability."6

The sufficiency of the plaintiffs proof under this standard was at issue
in one case decided during the survey period. In Adamson v. General
Electric Co.,8 the plaintiffs father died from mesothelioma that he
allegedly contracted while working as an electrician and an electrical
crew supervisor for thirty-five years at no fewer than eighteen job
sites." The plaintiff alleged that his father was exposed to asbestoscontaining products that were "mined, manufactured, processed,
imported, converted, compounded, sold or distributed by .. . 119 named
defendants."89 Five of the defendants who manufactured asbestoscontaining products-A.W. Chesterton Company, Garlock Sealing
Technologies, LLC, CBS Corporation (as successor to Westinghouse
Electric Corporation), General Electric Company, and Union Carbide
Corporation-moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
plaintiff lacked proof of his father's exposure to their products, and the
trial court granted their motions."
On appeal, the court of appeals reviewed the evidence relating to the
five manufacturers and concluded that the plaintiff's evidence as to each
was insufficient to satisfy his burden." With respect to Chesterton,
although the plaintiff presented evidence that Chesterton's asbestoscontaining products were used at a job site where his father worked, he
was unable to present any evidence that his father worked in proximity
to those products or that those products were used at the time his father
worked there." The same fate befell the plaintiff's claim against
Garlock: the plaintiff presented evidence that Garlock's asbestoscontaining products were used at the same job site where Chesterton's
asbestos-containing products were used, but he had no evidence that his

84. Hoffman, 248 Ga. App. at 612, 548 S.E.2d at 383.
85. Blackston, 764 F.2d at 1483.
86. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(d); Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 533 F. Supp. 183,
186 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (holding "that recognition of market share or industrywide liability
would result in an unprecedented departure from traditional Georgia tort law").
87. 303 Ga. App. 741, 694 S.E.2d 363 (2010).
88. Id. at 741, 694 S.E.2d at 365.
89. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id. at 741-42, 694 S.E.2d at 365-66.
91. Id. at 744-48, 694 S.E.2d at 367-70.
92. Id. at 745-46, 694 S.E.2d at 368.
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father used Garlock's asbestos-containing products or that they were
used in proximity to his father.' With respect to CBS and General
Electric, the plaintiff presented evidence that his father worked with
products that may have contained asbestos, but the evidence also showed
that those same products were made without asbestos.' The plaintiff
did not present any evidence as to when and where the asbestoscontaining products were used, so the evidence did not justify an
inference that the plaintiffs father used those products; it was just as
probable that he used only the products that did not contain asbestos.'
With respect to Union Carbide, the plaintiff presented evidence that his
father worked with a product named "Bakelite," but the evidence also
showed that his father used that term to describe other similar products
manufactured by different companies, did not know whether the product
contained asbestos, did not know who manufactured it, and was unable
to identify any product manufactured by Union Carbide.' Thus, the
plaintiffs evidence was insufficient to show that his father worked with
or in proximity to Union Carbide's asbestos-containing products.9
B. Necessity of Expert Testimony
Under Georgia law, a plaintiff must come forward with reliable expert
testimony to prove causation in most product liability cases.98 The
expert must "state an opinion regarding proximate causation in terms
stronger than that of medical possibility, i.e., reasonable medical
probability or reasonable medical certainty." To show that exposure
to a product was the cause of a plaintiffs injuries, the plaintiff must
prove general causation-that the product can cause injury-and specific
causation-that the specific product at issue caused the plaintiffs
injuries."oo
In Silverstein v. Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing Co.,"ox the
plaintiff brought suit against a mouthwash manufacturer because the
mouthwash allegedly stained teeth and reduced taste sensations.e"
In response to a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff came forward
with testimony from a periodontology professor who discussed his past
93. Id. at 746, 694 S.E.2d at 368-69.
94. Id. at 747, 694 S.E.2d at 369.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 748, 694 S.E.2d at 370.
97. Id.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Rodrigues v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 290 Ga. App. 442, 444, 661 S.E.2d 141, 143 (2008).
Ambling Mgmt. Co. v. Purdy, 283 Ga. App. 21, 29, 640 S.E.2d 620, 627 (2006).
Siharath v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1352 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
700 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (2009).

102. Id. at 1315.
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studies, which concluded that a chemical in the mouthwash would cause
tooth staining and taste impairment in a certain percentage of consumers. 10 With this evidence, the district court concluded that the
plaintiff had sufficient evidence of general causation."'' To prove
specific causation, the plaintiff relied on an affidavit from his dentist
who testified that because the plaintiff developed the staining immediately after using the mouthwash and the staining subsided after the
plaintiff stopped using the mouthwash, the mouthwash was the likely
cause of the plaintiff's stained teeth."
The defendant first attacked the affidavit by highlighting the
plaintiff's testimony that he did not know whether his teeth were stained
before he began using the mouthwash; the defendant contended that the
plaintiff had provided insufficient evidence from which the dentist could
conclude that the mouthwash caused the plaintiffs stained teeth.'0c
But the district court concluded that because the affiant was the
plaintiffs own dentist and had cared for the plaintiff for years, if the
staining had been present before the plaintiff used the mouthwash, this
dentist would have been aware of the pre-use staining.'1o
Next, the defendant argued that the dentist's conclusion was based
solely on the chronology of events and thereby used the forbidden
methodology of post hoc ergo propter hoc."' The district court dis-

agreed again." The district court reasoned that with the dentist's
historical knowledge of treating the plaintiffs teeth and review of
literature on the active chemical in the mouthwash, the dentist had
more evidence to reach his causation opinion than just the timing of the
stained teeth in relationship to the use of the mouthwash."'o
The defendant's final substantive argument was that the dentist's
opinion should be disregarded because he did not use a differential
diagnosis methodology in reaching his specific causation opinion."'
The district court disagreed and emphasized that differential diagnosis
is not the only way to prove causation."s The court offered little
additional justification for why differential diagnosis was not required
here but concluded that with this affidavit, the plaintiff had provided
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 1317.
Id. at 1318.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1319.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sufficient evidence of specific causation to survive summary judgment.113
III. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Expert Testimony
In February 2005, Georgia adopted the Daubert"' standard for
assessing the admissibility of testimony from expert witnesses in civil
actions." While the Georgia appellate courts have provided guidance
regarding the application of the Daubert standard in other types of
lawsuits, there have been few Daubert opinions from the Georgia
appellate courts in product liability cases.16 Without state appellate
court guidance, practitioners and judges must rely on decisions from the
federal courts as persuasive authority."' The following cases from
federal courts within the Eleventh Circuit offer recent guidance on
Daubert issues in product liability cases.
In Walker v. Blitz USA, Inc.,"' the plaintiff brought a strict liability
and negligence action against the manufacturer of a plastic gas can
contending that the can was defective because it did not contain a "flame
arrester," a metal device in the spout of the container that would prevent
flames from entering the can through the spout, a condition known as
a "flashback.""9 The plaintiff retained Andrew Armstrong, Ph.D., to
determine the conditions required to produce an explosive environment
in a plastic container and whether a flame arrester would mitigate any
volatile propensity of the container. In addition, the plaintiff retained
Jason Mardirosian to determine the source of the "boom" noise in the fire
at issue in the lawsuit to determine whether the ignition of gasoline
A.

113. Id. at 1318-19.
114. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
115. Ga. S. Bill 3, § 7, Reg. Sese., 2005 Ga. Laws 1, 8-10 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 24-967 to -67.1 (2010)).
116. See, e.g., Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Group, P.C., 285 Ga. 667, 681 S.E.2d 152
(2009) (medical malpractice); Mays v. Ellis, 283 Ga. App. 195, 641 S.E.2d 201 (2007)
(medical malpractice); Cotten v. Phillips, 280 Ga. App. 280, 633 S.E.2d 655 (2006) (medical
malpractice).
117. To interpret the application of Georgia's Daubert statute, courts may seek
guidance from the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), General ElectricCo. v. Joiner,522
U.S. 136 (1997), Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), and other federal
court interpretations of these decisions. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(f).
118. 663 F. Supp. 2d 1344 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
119. Id. at 1347.
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vapor or the later explosion most likely caused the death of the plaintiff's
daughter."2o
Dr. Armstrong, a chemist, conducted numerous tests of the type of
plastic container at issue and was able to create flashbacks within the
container but was unable to recreate a situation in which the container
ruptured."'1 In assessing the defendant's challenge under Federal
Rule of Evidence 702,122 the district court found that Dr. Armstrong's
testing did not fit the underlying facts." Given the plaintiffs allegation that a flashback caused the container to explode, Dr. Armstrong's
testing needed to show a flashback that resulted in an explosion."
Because he did not replicate the conditions on the day of the fire at
issue, Dr. Armstrong's methodology did not fit the facts of the case and
thus was inadmissible under the Daubertstandard.125
The methodology of Mardirosian suffered from similar infirmities. The
district court found that Mardirosian failed to adequately consider other
Although he reviewed
potential sources of the explosion at issue.'
depositions from the plaintiff and other scene witnesses, Mardirosian did
not have sufficient information regarding the possible items at the scene
that may have exploded because these witnesses did not testify about
those items."' Without this testimony, Mardirosian was unable to
know what items he should have considered as part of his analysis.12
With this flaw in Mardirosian's methodology, the district court held that
his testimony regarding the cause of the explosion was inadmissible.'
In Sands v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A.,"o the defendants
challenged the admissibility of testimony from the plaintiffs expert
witness, Michael Burleson, whom the plaintiff retained to provide
evidence of alternative designs for a personal watercraft (PWC)"' that
injured the plaintiff when she fell off it."' Specifically, the defendants
argued that Burleson's opinion was unreliable because there had been
no testing of his alternative designs. In addition, the defendants

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 1353-54.
Id. at 1354.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
Walker, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 1353, 1356.
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1355-56.
Id. at 1357.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1361.
No. CV608-009, 2009 WL 3152859 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2009).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *1.

2010]

PRODUCTLIABILITY

259

questioned whether Burleson had sufficient peer-reviewed literature and
publications supporting his opinions.a's
After reviewing Burleson's expert report and testimony, the district
court concluded that Burleson had shown sufficient testing of seatbacks
on other PWCs to show that his methodology was reliable."' The
absence of peer-reviewed literature and publications was not a dispositive factor here because the defendants failed to show how the absence
of these documents indicated that Burleson's methodology was unreliable."' Because the plaintiff was able to come forward with evidence
of Burleson's testing, the district court found that Burleson's methodology was reliable and denied the defendants' motion.3 s

In Guinn v. AstraZeneca PharmaceuticalsLP,"' the plaintiff contended that her use of Seroquel caused her to develop diabetes and
retained Dr. Jennifer Marks to provide specific causation testimony.'8
In ruling on the defendants' Rule 702 motion challenging the admissibility of Dr. Marks' testimony, the district court concluded that Dr. Marks
did not undertake a reliable methodology to show that Seroquel caused
the plaintiff's weight gain and diabetes. The district court excluded her
testimony.'39
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the exclusion of Dr. Marks'
testimony, holding that she undertook an unreliable methodology to
reach her conclusions. 4 o First, the court concluded that Dr. Marks did
not properly perform a differential diagnosis because she did not
consider other alternative causes for the plaintiffs weight gain and
diabetes. 4 ' Instead, Dr. Marks explained that other risk factors were
present before the plaintiff took Seroquel and the plaintiff did not
develop diabetes until after she took Seroquel." The court explained
that "Itlemporal proximity is generally not a reliable indicator of a
Dr. Marks' own testimony indicated that
causal relationship."'"
diabetes develops over the course of many years, and the diagnosis is
typically made after the patient has actually had diabetes for up to five

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *3-4.
602 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1251-52.
Id. at 1254-55, 1257.
Id. at 1254.
Id.
Id.
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years.'" Finally, the court concluded that Dr. Marks' conclusion did
not fit the facts of the case because she made no effort to explain how
the plaintiff's other risk factors could have contributed to the plaintiffs
development of diabetes."

B. Other Similar Incidents
Given the persuasive power of evidence of allegedly similar incidents,
the admission of other incident evidence is a common battleground in
product liability trials. To balance the prejudicial impact of this
evidence with the probative value of truly similar events, the Georgia
Supreme Court has required that other acts or omissions must be
substantially similar to the defect alleged, adopting the following
stringent standard for admissibility:
In products liability cases, the "rule of substantial similarity" prohibits
the admission into evidence of other transactions, occurrences, or
claims unless the proponent first shows that there is a "substantial
similarity" between the other transactions, occurrences, or claims and
the claim at issue in the litigation. The showing of substantial
similarity must include a showing of similarity as to causation. Before
admitting proffered evidence of other transactions in products liability
cases, the trial court must satisfy itself that the rule of substantial
similarity has been met.'"
The Georgia Court of Appeals applied this standard in FordMotor Co.
v. Reese," an automotive product liability lawsuit arising from an
allegedly defective seatback."" At trial, the plaintiffs introduced
evidence of other complaints against Ford that alleged defects in
seatbacks. On appeal, Ford contended that the plaintiffs had failed to
show the requisite substantial similarity between these other complaints
and this lawsuit."" But the court of appeals disagreed.s During
discovery, Ford had admitted that the other incidents at issue involved
similar seat designs in similar accident scenarios that resulted in similar
seatback failures."1 Given this evidentiary basis, the court of appeals

144. Id. at 1257.
145. Id.
146. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Crosby, 273 Ga. 454,455, 543 S.E.2d 21,23-24 (2001)
(footnotes omitted).
147. 300 Ga. App. 82, 684 S.E.2d 279 (2009).
148. Id. at 82, 684 S.E.2d at 282.
149. Id. at 89, 684 S.E.2d at 286.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 90, 684 S.E.2d at 287.
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held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in allowing the
admission of the other incidents.5

C. Seat Belt Use
Georgia courts and federal courts applying Georgia law have
consistently held that the plain language of Georgia's seat belt statute
prohibits the jury from considering evidence of an occupant's failure to
use a seat belt."' The plain language of the relevant statute states,
The failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seat safety belt
in any seat of a motor vehicle which has a seat safety belt or belts shall
not be considered evidence of negligence or causation, shall not
otherwise be considered by the finder of fact on any question of liability
of any person . . . and shall not be evidence used to diminish any

recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance,
occupancy, or operation of a motor vehicle."
The decision in Denton v. DaimlerChryslerCorp.166 highlights the
harsh consequences of this evidentiary prohibition. In that case, the
district court allowed the defendant to present evidence of seat belt
nonuse because the plaintiff introduced evidence of seat belt use by the
plaintiff's decedent." But at the conclusion of the trial, the district
court charged the jury that evidence regarding seat belt use or nonuse
could not be considered regarding liability or damages."
In assessing the defendant's motion for a new trial, the district court
clarified that by allowing the jury to receive seat belt use or nonuse
evidence, the court did not implicitly authorize the jury to use this
evidence during their deliberations." To the contrary, the charge that
was given prohibited the consideration of either type of evidence."
In response to the defendant's contention that the seat belt evidence
pertained to the overall design of the restraint system and not the
prohibited uses of showing negligence or causation, the court noted that
the defendant failed to request a charge that would instruct the jury on

152. Id
153. C.W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. Gover, 263 Ga. 108, 428 S.E.2d 796 (1993);
Crosby v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 240 Ga. App. 857, 863-64, 524 S.E.2d 313, 320-21
(1999), rev'd on other grounds, Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Crosby, 273 Ga. 454, 543
S.E.2d 21 (2001).
154. O.C.G.A. § 40-8-76.1(d) (Supp. 2010).
155. 645 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
156. Id. at 1222.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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this other use of seat belt evidence." Because the defendant failed to
request this jury instruction, the district court held that the defendant
waived any objection. 16 1
In sum, the district court allowed the jury to hear evidence of both
seat belt use and nonuse and then instructed the jury not to consider
either type of evidence.16 2 With this ultimate result, it is unclear why
the court ever allowed the evidence to be introduced when it was first
offered.
IV.

A.

DEFENSES

Preemption
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that

federal law is "the supreme Law of the Land[,] ...

any Thing in the

Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.-l63
Thus, state laws that conflict with federal law are "without effect."16
A state law conflicts with a federal law "ifit interferes with the methods
by which the federal statute was designed to reach [its] goal," even if
both the federal law and the state law have the same goal.'" Although preemption issues are typically analyzed in connection with a
federal statute, a federal regulation may have the same preemptive
effect as a federal statute." State laws subject to preemption include
not only state statutes and regulations but also tort duties imposed by
state common law and enforced by lawsuits.167

160. Id.
161. Id. In addressing the procedural miscue of the defendant in failing to request the
charge, the district court did not indicate-or even mildly forecast-whether it would have
instructed the jury to consider the seat belt evidence as it related to the overall design of
the restraint system if the charge had been properly requested. Id.
162. Id.
163. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, el. 2.
164. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
165. Intl Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987).
166. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) (holding that "a federal
agency acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may [also] preempt state regulation"); Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154
(1982) (noting that a "narrow focus on Congress' intent to supersede state law [is]
misdirected" when a state law is claimed to be preempted by a federal agency's regulation).
167. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993); Cipollone v. Liggett
Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504,521-22 (1992); see also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen's
Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) ("The obligation to pay compenisation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling
policy.").
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"The critical question in any pre-emption analysis is always whether
Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state law."'" In
fact, Congress's purpose in enacting the federal law is the "ultimate
touchstone" of the preemption analysis. 169 Congress may manifest its
intent to preempt state law in three ways:
First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments
pre-empt state law. Pre-emption fundamentally is a question of
congressional intent, and when Congress has made its intent known
through explicit statutory language, the courts' task is an easy one.
Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is
pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress
intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively. Such an
intent may be inferred from a scheme of federal regulation so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it, or where an Act of Congress touches a field in
which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will
be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.
Finally, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually
conflicts with federal law. Thus, the Court has found pre-emption
where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and
federal requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.'"o
Although Congress's purpose is important, there is a presumption that
Congress did not intend to preempt state law, especially when it "has
legislated ...

in a field which the States have traditionally occu-

Because "the regulation of health and safety matters is
pied.""7
primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern, 2 state law
regulating these matters is preempted only if Congress's intent to do so
is "clear and manifest."' Thus, when faced with two or more plausible interpretations of a federal law, this presumption imposes on courts
"a duty to accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption."'
168. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 369.
169. Retail Clerks Intl Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
170. English v. Gen. Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72,78-79 (1990) (citations, punctuation, and
internal quotation marks omitted).
171. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
172. Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,719 (1985);
see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("So we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.").
173. HillsboroughCnty., 471 U.S. at 715 (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).
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1. Military Contractor Defense. Generally, state law is not
preempted unless there is a clear federal statutory or regulatory
prescription or a direct conflict between federal and state law, but there
are "a few areas, involving uniquely federal interests, [that] are so
committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal
control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by
federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive)
The procurement of military equipment by the
by the courts."'
United States is one such area of unique federal interest, so when there
is a significant conflict between a state-law duty of care and the
contractor's duty under its contract with the government, the state-law
duty of care must yield."" This type of preemption'" is referred to
as the military contractor defense, and it precludes state-law liability for
design defects in military equipment "when (1) the United States
approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed
to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States
about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the
The rationale for this
supplier but not to the United States."7
defense is that "[tihe imposition of liability on Government contractors
will directly affect the terms of Government contracts: either the
contractor will decline to manufacture the design specified by the
Government, or it will raise its price. Either way, the interests of the
United States will be directly affected.""'

175. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
176. Id. at 507-08.
177. This defense has also been characterized as a form of sovereign immunity. Gray
v. Lockheed Aeronautical Sys. Co., 125 F.3d 1371, 1377 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Harduvel
v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989)) ("This'defense derives from
the principle that where a contractor acts under the authority and direction of the United
States, it shares the sovereign immunity' that the government eqjoys."), rev'd and
remanded, 524 U.S. 924 (1998),judgment reinstatedin part and vacated on other grounds
in part, 155 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
178. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512. The Eleventh Circuit has described this defense in much
simpler terms: "Stripped to its essentials, the military contractor defense is available only
when the defendant demonstrates with respect to its design and manufacturing decisions
that 'the government made me do it.'" Gray, 125 F.3d at 1377 (quoting In re Joint E. &
S. Dist. N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626, 632 (2d Cir. 1990)).
179. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507. The Supreme Court also noted that "[t]he financial burden
ofjudgments against the contractors would ultimately be passed through, substantially if
not totally, to the United States itself, since defense contractors will predictably raise their
prices to cover, or to insure against, contingent liability for the Government-ordered
designs." Id. at 511-12.
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The military contractor defense was involved in one case decided by
the Eleventh Circuit during the survey period. In Brinson v. Raytheon
Co.," the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the T-6A Texan II
airplane that her husband, a captain in the United States Air Force
Reserves, was copiloting when it crashed near Savannah.'a
The
airplane was a single-propeller model that incorporated a trim aid device
to compensate for the P Factor, which "is a natural aerodynamic
property of single propeller-driven planes [that] causes the air[planel to
yaw and roll to the left.""' Normally, the pilot of a single-propeller
airplane has to adjust the airplane's rudder manually to compensate for
the P Factor, but the trim aid device incorporated into the T-6A airplane
was designed to adjust the rudder automatically through a series of bell
cranks and pushrods.'m
The plaintiff contended that the T-6A airplane was defectively
designed in two ways. First, the trim aid device was designed such that
the entire system would fail if one component failed, and the plaintiff
argued that the manufacturer should have included redundancies to
prevent a complete system failure in the event of a single point failure.
Second, the pushrods were lined with Teflon to make them selflubricating and easier to maintain, and the plaintiff argued that they
were more likely to fracture and fail because of how Teflon reacts to
humidity. According to the plaintiff, these two design defects caused the
crash because one of the pushrods fractured during takeoff, when the P
Factor is most pronounced, which then caused the entire trim aid device
system to fail. Without the trim aid device to compensate for the P
Factor, the airplane went into a severe, uncommanded left roll and
crashed. The manufacturer of the airplane filed a motion for summary
judgment based on the military contractor defense, and the district court
granted the motion.'
On appeal, the plaintiff argued only that the manufacturer did not
present sufficient evidence to satisfy the first and second prongs of the
military contractor defense; she did not challenge the manufacturer's
evidence on the third prong." The first prong-government approval
of reasonably precise specifications-"is meant to ensure that a
government officer considered and approved 'the design feature in

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

571 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1349.
Id.
Id
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1351.
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question.'"'s Although government officials were not involved in the
initial design and patent of the T-6A airplane, Air Force engineers were
heavily involved in the development of the airplane, and they reviewed
and approved the design drawings for all systems, including the trim aid
device." Moreover, in January 2004, three months before the crash,
the Air Force issued a Technical Compliance/Technical Order (TCTO),
which acknowledged that some of the pushrods were defective and
required that the pushrods be replaced with new, but identically
designed, pushrods.2se The Eleventh Circuit decided as a matter of
first impression that post-design, post-production evidence such as the
TCTO could be used to satisfy the first prong.s Based on the "ample
undisputed evidence of a 'continuous back and forth' between [the
manufacturer] and governmental representatives during the development of the T-6A," combined with the TCTO, the court held that the
manufacturer satisfied its burden of showing meaningful government
review and approval of reasonably precise specifications concerning the
trim aid device."
The second prong-the equipment's conformity to the specifications-was much easier for the court to resolve in the manufacturer's
favor.191 According to the court, the manufacturer's evidence showed
that (1) the Air Force engineers reviewed the design drawings to ensure
that the T-6A airplane was built according to the design specifications;
(2) a government representative signed a Material Inspection and
Receiving Report for the airplane that the plaintiff's husband was
copiloting when the crash occurred, which stated that the airplane was
accepted and that it conformed to the contract; and (3) there was a
continuous exchange between the manufacturer and the government,
which not only supported the first prong but also was indicative of
conformity.192 The plaintiff attempted to refute this evidence by
arguing that the trim aid device did not comply with the Airworthiness
Standards for Acrobatic Category Airplanes, but the court rejected this
argument because compliance with these regulations had nothing to do

186. Id. (quoting Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512).
187. Id. at 1350, 1354-55.
188. Id at 1350, 1355.
189. Id at 1352. The court refused to question the wisdom of the Air Force's decision
on how to address the defect that it acknowledged in the TCTO: "When faced with a
potentially failing or defective part, the military may make a discretionary decision
concerning how to address the problem. We do not want to 'second-guess' that judgment
through a state law tort suit." Id. at 1353.
190. Id. at 1355-56.
191. Id. at 1357-58.
192. Id. at 1357.
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with whether the T-6A airplane conformed to the government-approved
As the court explained, "[the plaintiffJ points to no
specifications."
facts suggesting that the [trim aid device] or any other component of the
rudder trim system was not built exactly as it was designed.""
Essentially, the plaintiff's argument was that the T-6A airplane did not
conform to its design specifications because the trim aid device system
failed, but the court noted that nonconformity "must mean more than
that the design does not work in compliance with some general
admonition against an unwanted condition."" Thus, the plaintiff's
argument would have eviscerated the military contractor defense
because l[a] product involved in a design-induced accident would, as a
definitional matter, always be deemed not to comply with such
generalities since no performance specifications approved by the
government would purposely allow a design that would result in an
accident."'" The court concluded that because the manufacturer had
satisfied all the requirements of the military contractor defense, it was
entitled to summary judgment.'o
2. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. Pursuant to the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966," the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration has promulgated the Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS)'" to further the Act's
purpose of "reduc[ing] traffic accidents and deaths and injuries resulting
from traffic accidents."
FMVSS 208 governs "performance requirements for the protection of vehicle occupants in crashes," and its purpose
"is to reduce the number of deaths of vehicle occupants, and the severity
of injuries, by specifying ...

equipment requirements for active and

passive restraint systems."se The type of restraint system required
depends on the type of vehicle and date of manufacture.m In Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co.,' the Supreme Court of the United States
held that when FMVSS 208 allows the manufacturer to choose a

193. Id. at 1358.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1358 n.11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
196. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. Id. at 1358-59.
198. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (repealed 1994). Congress repealed the Act in 1994 and
recodified it at 49 U.S.C. §§30101-30170 (2006).
199. 49 C.F.R. pt. 571 (2009).
200. 49 U.S.C. § 30101.
201. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208.S1-S2.
202. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208.84.
203. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
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restraint system from among several options, and the manufacturer
selects one of those options for a vehicle, a state-law tort claim premised
on a duty to implement a different restraint system conflicts with and
However, FMVSS 208 does not
is preempted by FMVSS 208.'
preempt a state-law tort claim based on an allegation that the design
utilized by the manufacturer was defective.'
Prior to the survey period, few courts had considered whether FMVSS
208 preempts a state-law tort claim based on the absence of a sideimpact airbag, but the Northern District of Georgia considered such a
claim in Ellison v. Ford Motor Co.2 6 This case involved a side-impact
collision between the plaintiffs, who were in a 2004 F-250 truck, and
Brandon Howard, who was in an F-450 truck. The restraint system in
the plaintiffs' truck consisted of frontal impact airbags, knee bolsters,
active lap/shoulder seatbelts with emergency locking retractor mechanisms, and other passive occupant protection devices, all of which were
available for both front seating positions. The vehicle also utilized a
collapsible steering column. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged
that their truck was defectively designed because it did not include a
side-impact airbag, and the manufacturer moved for summary judgment
on the ground that FMVSS 208 preempted this claim."'
Preliminarily, the district court had to determine whether FMVSS 208
or FMVSS 214 governed the plaintiffs' claim.2 The plaintiffs argued
that the controlling standard was FMVSS 214, which "specifies
performance requirements for protection of occupants in side impact
crashes," and that this standard did not preempt their claim.209
Importantly, however, the version of FMVSS 214 in effect at the time
the plaintiffs' truck was manufactured did not provide requirements
relating to airbags or other occupant restraint systems but instead
specified crashworthiness requirements.21 0 Because the plaintiffs
challenged the type of restraint system chosen by the manufacturer and
did not contend that their truck failed to satisfy FMVSS 214's sideimpact crashworthiness requirements, the court concluded that FMVSS
208 governed their claim."1 ' Moreover, the district court noted that

204.
205.
(2008).
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 877-81.
Parks v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 294 Ga. App. 112, 114, 668 S.E.2d 554, 557
650 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
Id. at 1300-02.
Id. at 1302.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 49 C.F.R. § 571.214.S1(a) (2009).
Ellison, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1302-03.
Id. at 1303.
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nothing in FMVSS 208 limited its applicability to front-impact collisions.sts
The version of FMVSS 208 applicable to the plaintiffs' truck allowed
the manufacturer to choose from among several alternatives for the
truck's restraint system, and the frontal/angular automatic protection
system chosen by the manufacturer complied with the requirements for
that system. 213 None of the options allowed by FMVSS 208 at that
time required side-impact airbags to be included, so the court found that
the plaintiffs' claim "would require [the manufacturer] to adopt an
additional crash protection system not specified in FMVSS 208, and
essentially would foreclose the option specifically allowed by FMVSS
208-to include either manual Type 1 or Type 2 seat belts or to include
passive restraints." 14 Because this additional requirement would
conflict with FMVSS 208, the district court held that the plaintiffs' claim
was preempted."1 '
The district court in Ellison found support for its decision in Anthony
v. Abbott,""e which involved a similar allegation about the manufacturer's failure to include a side-impact airbag in the plaintiffs' vehicle. 2 17
Relying entirely on Geier and the manufacturer's undisputed compliance
with FMVSS 208, the District of the Virgin Islands held in Anthony that
the manufacturer's alleged duty to install a side-impact airbag conflicted
with FMVSS 208 and was therefore preempted. 218 After Ellison,
however, the District of Hawaii held in Durham v. County of Maui219
that FMVSS 208 did not preempt a claim alleging that a vehicle was
defective because it did not have a side-impact airbag.220 The court in
Durhamexplained that the plaintiffs' claim did not conflict with the goal
of reducing deaths and injuries caused by traffic accidents; to the
contrary, allowing the plaintiffs' claim to proceed would "advance-not
thwart-this statutory and regulatory purpose."22 ' The court distinguished Geier on the ground that it involved multiple options from which
the manufacturer could choose, including an option that allowed the

212. Id. at 1302.
213. Id. at 1303-04.
214. Id. at 1305 & n.3.
215. Id. at 1305.
216. 289 F. Supp. 2d 667 (D.V.I. 2003).
217. Ellison, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1305 (citing Anthony, 289 F. Supp. at 669). The distrct
court also cited to an unpublished order from a California trial court holding that FMVSS
208 preempted a claim based on the absence of a side-impact airbag. Id. at 1306.
218. 289 F. Supp. 2d at 669-70 (citing Geier, 529 U.S. at 864-65).
219. 696 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (D. Haw. 2010).
220. Id. at 1161-62.
221. Id. at 1158.
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manufacturer to forgo the feature that the plaintiff alleged should have
been included, whereas FMVSS 208 did not provide the manufacturer in
Durham with the option of excluding side-impact airbags. 22 2 Because
FMVSS 208 did not include any requirements relating to side-impact
airbags, the district court in Durham held that there could be no
conflicting requirements between FMVSS 208 and a state-law duty to
include side-impact airbags." The district court in Durham acknowledged the contrary holdings in Ellison and Anthony but distinguished
those cases on the ground that they involved different vehicles and
The requiretherefore different requirements under FMVSS 208.'
ments applicable to the vehicles in Ellison and Anthony provided the
manufacturers with options, which meant that those cases were properly
controlled by Geier."
3. United States Food and Drug Administration Approval of
Generic Drugs. In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision last year
in Wyeth v. Levine,' which held that the FDA's approval of a brandname drug does not preempt a state-law claim for failure to warn,m'
several courts faced preemption arguments with respect to the FDA's
approval of generic drugs. This is an important issue because 70% of all
prescriptions in the United States are filled with generic drugs.' At
first glance, it seems that Levine would apply to brand-name and generic
drugs, but the generic manufacturers have argued that the differences
in the approval process and in the labeling requirements mandated a
different result. Their arguments have not met with much success.
For example, in Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc.2" the generic manufacturers
argued that the plaintiff's state-law tort claims were preempted because
(1) generic manufacturers do not have the same ability to change their
labels as brand-name manufacturers,"s and (2) the costs to generic
manufacturers of proposing label changes to the FDA would thwart the
The
goal of bringing low-cost generic drugs to market quickly."a

222. Id. at 1159-61.
223. Id. at 1159.
224. Id. at 1161.
225. Id. at 1161-62.
226. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
227. Id. at 1196-204. For an in-depth discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in
Levine, see Brannen & Daly, supra note 1, at 281-86.
228. Susan Okie, MultinationalMedicines-EnsuringDrugQuality in anEra of Global
Manufacturing,361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 737, 738 (2009).
229. 588 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009).
230. Id. at 608.
231. Id. at 611.
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Eighth Circuit rejected these arguments and held that the plaintiffs
state-law tort claims were not preempted. 2 First, although the label
for a generic drug must be substantively identical to the label for its
brand-name counterpart, the court held that this requirement does not
render generic manufacturers impotent to affect label changes.'
Generic manufacturers may propose label changes to the FDA, or they
could suggest that the FDA send warning letters to physicians."'
Whatever limitations they may face in comparison to the brand-name
manufacturers, they may not "passively ...

accept the inadequacy of

their drug's label as they market and profit from it."235
explained,

The court

The generic defendants were not compelled to market metoclopramide. If they realized their label was insufficient but did not believe
they could even propose a label change, they could have simply stopped
selling the product. Instead, they are alleged to have placed a drug
with inadequate labeling on the market and profited from its sales. If
[the plaintiff'a] injuries resulted from their failure to take steps to warn
their customers sufficiently of the risks from taking their drugs, they
may be held liable.'
Second, the court was not persuaded that the cost of proposing label
Although a requested
changes would be prohibitively expensive."
label change must be supported by scientific validation, there is no
requirement that a manufacturer obtain such scientific validation
through its own clinical testing; it may rely on studies conducted by
others. 23 8 Moreover, generic manufacturers are already required to
collect and report adverse drug events to the FDA.' 9 Thus, although
Congress enacted a simplified process for getting generic drugs to
market quickly and cheaply, it did not intend to relieve generic
manufacturers from their obligation to ensure that their products are
safe.o For all these reasons, the court held that state-law tort claims
against generic manufacturers are not preempted.24 1

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 608-12.
Id. at 608-11.
Id. at 610.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 611.
Id. at 611-12.
Id.
Id. at 612.
Id.
Id.
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The Fifth Circuit reached a similar result in Demahy v. Actavis,
Inc." earlier this year. In an attempt to distinguish the Supreme
Court's decision in Levine, the generic manufacturer argued "that generic
drugs are different because the manufacturer of a name brand drug may
change its label unilaterally-through the 'changes being effected' (CBE)
process-while seeking the FDA's approval of the change," whereas "a
generic manufacturer ... must produce the same drug and use the same
Because of this
label as the name brand drug manufacturer."'
difference, the generic manufacturer argued that it could not comply
with a state-law duty to modify its labeling without violating federal
The Fifth Circuit discounted this argument because "[tihe
law."
regulations on which [the generic manufacturer] relies ...

do not

purport to bar generic label[] modifications following initial approval.
Instead, they require only that a generic's label initially conform to the
They do not address post-approval modificalisted drug's [label] ....
tions at all.""' In fact, "the regulatory framework makes plain that
manufacturers-name brand and generic alike-must act to warn
customers when they learn that they may be marketing an unsafe
drug."
The court held that generic manufacturers may comply with
this obligation by proposing label changes through the CBE process or
the prior approval process, or by suggesting that the FDA communicate
warnings to physicians through "Dear Doctor" letters."' The generic
manufacturer also asserted the same argument about the cost of
proposing label changes that the generic manufacturers asserted in
Mensing, and the court rejected that argument for the same reason that
the Eight Circuit rejected it." Finally, the court offered a practical
explanation for holding that state-law tort claims against generic
manufacturers are not preempted: "To hold otherwise would leave us
with the bizarre conclusion that Congress intended to implicitly deprive
a plaintiff whose doctor prescribes a generic drug of any remedy, while
under Levine, that same plaintiff would have a state-law claim had she
only demanded a name brand drug instead."24 9
The Eleventh Circuit has not addressed this issue, but two district
courts in Georgia did so during the survey period. In Weilbrenner v.

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

593 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 433.
Id. at 436.
Id.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 439-45.
Id. at 446-49; see also Mensing, 588 F.3d at 611-12.
Demahy, 593 F.3d at 449.
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Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,2" which involved minocycline, a

generic antibiotic used to treat bacterial infections such as acne,m1 the
generic manufacturer asserted the same preemption arguments that the
After
generic manufacturers in Mensing and Demahy asserted.
extensively reviewing the opinions in Mensing and Demahy and noting
that most district courts that have considered the issue since Levine
have rejected the preemption defense, the court aligned itself with the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits and held that the plaintiffs state-law tort
claim was not preempted.' The court explained,
Simply by proposing a label change or requesting that the FDA send
out a "Dear Doctor" letter, generic manufacturers can comply with FDA
rules and regulations and, at the same time, meet their state law duty
to warn the public of any known risks. [The generic manufacturer's]
argument that there is no assurance that a requested label change
would have been granted by the FDA does not alter the Court's
decision, as [what the FDA might have done once the manufacturer]
suggested these changes is immaterial to the imposition of liability.
There simply is no evidence in the record that suggests that the FDA
would have rejected a labeling proposal from [the generic manufacturer]. Further, allowing state law failure-to-warn claims in no way
obstructs the purposes of federal law. On the contrary, the purpose of
all the FDA rules and regulations is to ensure that the public receives
safe drugs. Allowing state law claims furthers consumer protection
and safety.'
Twelve days later, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia reached the same conclusion in Swicegood v. Pliva,
Inc.,255 a case involving metoclopramide, the generic form of Reglan
Relying principally
used to treat gastroesophageal reflux disease.'
on Mensing and Demahy, the court rejected the same preemption arguments for the same reasons.

B. Learned IntermediaryDoctrine
As a general rule, a manufacturer owes a duty to foreseeable users of
The
its product to warn about foreseeable dangers in the product.'
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

696 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (M.D. Ga. 2010).
Id. at 1331.
Id. at 1333-34.
Id. at 1334-38.
Id. at 1338 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
No. 1:07-CV-1671-TWT, 2010 WL 1138455 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2010).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *5-7.
Moore v. ECI Mgmt., 246 Ga. App. 601, 606, 542 S.E.2d 115, 120-21 (2000).
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learned intermediary doctrine is an exception to this general rule that
applies in the healthcare context to relieve manufacturers of prescription
drugs and medical devices from liability for failure to warn."e The
rationale for this doctrine stems from a respect for the doctor-patient
relationship: "the treating physician is in a better position to warn the
patient than the manufacturer, in that the decision to employ prescription medication [or medical devices] involves professional assessment of
medical risks in light of the physician's knowledge of a patient's
Thus, under the learned
particular need and susceptibilities."
intermediary doctrine, a manufacturer does not have a duty to warn the
patient of the dangers associated with the drug or device.2 1 Instead,
the manufacturer has a duty to warn the patient's doctor, and it satisfies
this duty by providing a reasonable or adequate warning under the
circumstances of the case.2 2 For a warning to be reasonable or
adequate, "it must provide a complete disclosure of the existence and
extent of the risk involved."2 " Whether a warning is reasonable or
adequate is often a question of fact for the jury, but it can be decided by
the court as a matter of law if the warning is accurate, clear, and
unambiguous. 6
During the survey period, two federal courts confronted the issue of
whether the warning that accompanied a prescription drug reasonably
or adequately informed the plaintiff's doctor about the risks associated
with the drug. In the first case, Swicegood v. Pliva, Inc.,2" Dr.
Michael Reese prescribed metoclopramide, the generic form of Reglan
that had been approved by the FDA, to treat the plaintiff's dyspepsia
and gastroesophageal reflux disease. Alleging that she developed tardive
dyskinesia, a neurological disorder that causes involuntary muscle

259. Hawkins v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 147 Ga. App. 481, 482-83, 249 S.E.2d 286,
287-88 (1978) (en banc); Parke, Davis & Co. v. Mayes, 124 Ga. App. 224, 224, 183 S.E.2d
410, 410 (1971); Webb v. Sandoz Chem. Works, Inc., 85 Ga. App. 405, 409-10, 69 S.E.2d
689, 692-93 (1952).
260. McCombs v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 277 Ga. 252, 253, 587 S.E.2d 594, 595 (2003)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Thornton v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 22 F.3d 284, 289 (11th Cir. 1994)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
264. Compare McCombs v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 266 Ga. App. 304, 304, 596 S.E.2d 780,
780 (2004) (en banc) (holding that the warning included with the package insert was
reasonable and adequate as a matter of law), with Bryant v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 262
Ga. App. 401, 410, 585 S.E.2d 723, 730 (2003) (physical precedent) (holding that factual
disputes regarding the adequacy or reasonableness of the warning precluded summary
judgment).
265. No. 1:07-CV-1671-TWT, 2010 WL 1138455 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2010).
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contractions, the plaintiff sued Pliva, the manufacturer of metoclopramide, and Barr Pharmaceuticals, the manufacturer of Reglan, for strict
liability, negligence, and breach of warranty.'
Pliva moved for
summary judgment on the plaintiffs claim for failure to warn, arguing
that it adequately warned Dr. Reese about the risks of metoclopramide
because its label warned doctors that metoclopramide could cause
tardive dyskinesia, and Dr. Reese testified that he was aware of this
risk.26 7 However, based on Dr. Reese's other testimony, the district
court held that "a reasonable juror could infer[] that Dr. Reese did not
know the extent of the risk involved."2' Accordingly, the court denied
Pliva's motion on this claim.'

In the second case, Weilbrenner v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA,
Inc.,270 the plaintiff, a fifteen-year-old girl, contracted optic disc edema,
papilledema, and pseudotumor cerebri after ingesting fifty-four capsules
of minocycline over a period of about four months. Minocycline is an
antibiotic that the FDA has approved for the treatment of bacterial
infections, including acne. At the time the plaintiff's primary care
physician, Dr. Robert Hawes, prescribed minocycline to treat her acne,
the package insert warned about an association between the use of
tetracyclines and pseudotumor cerebri in adults, and it indicated that
the usual symptoms were headache and blurred vision. The package
insert went on to say that these conditions and symptoms usually
resolved after discontinuation of the tetracycline, but it also acknowledged the possibility of permanent sequelae. Dr. Hawes did not review
the package insert at that time, but he thought that he reviewed
information about minocycline at some point before then, though he
could not remember exactly when or where. The plaintiff alleged that
her injuries were caused by minocycline, that the label was defective,
and that the manufacturer did not adequately communicate to physicians the risk of pseudotumor cerebri and permanent vision loss in
adolescents from using minocycline. 271
The manufacturer moved for summary judgment on the ground that
the learned intermediary doctrine barred the plaintiff's failure-to-warn
claim because the warnings on the package insert were adequate as a
matter of law. The plaintiff's expert testified that the label was
inadequate and defective because (1) the warning as to pseudotumor
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Id. at 1331-32.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

276

[Vol. 62

cerebri was not specific as to minocycline, (2) it did not warn about a
risk of pseudotumor cerebri or permanent vision loss in adolescents, and
(3) it did not instruct users to be checked regularly for papilledema while
using minocycline.272 Noting that the adequacy of a warning is usually
a question of fact but that it can be decided as a matter of law if the
warning is clear, accurate, and unambiguous, the district court rejected
the manufacturer's argument and held that the plaintiff's evidence
created a question of fact regarding the adequacy of minocycline's label
for a jury to decide." The court first explained that "[tlhe fact that
the package insert mentioned [pseudotumor cerebril does not make the
warning adequate as a matter of law."' 4 Instead, the question is
whether a label reasonably informs physicians about the risks of the
drug.275 The court found that there was conflicting evidence on this
point because the warning about pseudotumor cerebri was directed only
to adults and not to pediatric patients, a group that includes adolescents
Because "the FDA requires warning informasuch as the plaintiff.'
tion for pediatric patients separate and apart from that provided for
adult patients," the court declined to hold that "Dr. Hawes could, would,
or should have assumed that the minocycine [pseudotumor cerebril
warning for adults also applied to adolescents or other pediatric subIn addition, the court questioned the reasonableness of
groups."
minocycline's label because it referred only to risks associated with the
use of tetracyclines.sre Although minocycline is a type of tetracycline,
the manufacturer's own expert testified that a warning related to one
does not necessarily apply to the other.27" For all of these reasons, the
district court denied the manufacturer's motion on the ground that there
was a factual dispute regarding the adequacy of minocycline's label.280
The district court then turned to the issue of proximate cause.28
"Where a learned intermediary has actual knowledge of the substance
of the alleged warning and would have taken the same course of action
even with the information the plaintiff contends should have been
provided," the manufacturer usually will be entitled to summary
judgment on the ground that the causal link between the allegedly

272.
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275.
276.
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279.
280.
281.
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Id. at 1339-40.
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The
inadequate warning and the plaintiffs injury is broken."'
manufacturer argued that the plaintiff could not prove proximate cause
because Dr. Hawes did not read the label, and there was no evidence
that he would have decided not to prescribe minocycline even if he had
read the label and if the label had included additional warnings.'
However, while it was true that Dr. Hawes did not read the label at the
time he prescribed minocycline for the plaintiff,' his deposition
testimony gave rise to a reasonable inference that he reviewed the
prescribing information for minocycline sometime in the past.m
Further, Dr. Hawes testified by affidavit after his deposition that he
most likely would not have prescribed minocycline for the plaintiff if he
had known about a risk of pseudotumor cerebri or permanent vision loss
in adolescents, that he would have instructed the plaintiff to discontinue
the drug and to come to his office if she had any headaches or visual
disturbances, and that he would have had the plaintiff checked regularly
for papilledema while using the drug.' The fact that Dr. Hawes gave
arguably contradictory testimony in his deposition was a matter for
cross-examination at trial, not a reason to grant summary judgment.
The issue of proximate cause in the context of the learned intermediary doctrine also arose in one case decided by the Eleventh Circuit
during the survey period. In Dietz v. Smith~ine Beecham Corp.,'
the plaintiff's husband went to his family practitioner, Dr. James Zuppa,
complaining of anxiety, depression, insomnia, and stress, but he
disclaimed any suicidal ideation and did not disclose any history of
psychological illness. Dr. Zuppa diagnosed the plaintiff's husband with
major depression and offered to hospitalize him for psychiatric treatment, but he declined. Dr. Zuppa then prescribed Paxil, an antidepressant drug, for the plaintiff's husband, instructed him to come back in
three weeks or sooner if he experienced an acute crisis, and referred him
to a psychologist. Eight days later, the plaintiffs husband committed
suicide. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer for, among other things,
failure to warn about the risk of suicide associated with Paxil." 9 The
district court granted summary judgment for the manufacturer, and the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that the plaintiff could not
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Wheat v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 46 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
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prove that the allegedly inadequate warnings proximately caused her
husband's suicide.o Because Dr. Zuppa testified that "even when
provided with the most current research and FDA mandated warnings,
he still would have prescribed Paxil for [the plaintiffs husband's]
depression," the court held that "any potential chain of causation
through which [the plaintiff] could seek relief" was severed."

C. Product Misuse or Alteration
A manufacturer may be subject to strict liability for injuries proximately caused by a defect in its product only if the defect was present
when the product was sold."' Indeed, "[olne of the conditions for
imposition of strict liability against a manufacturer of defective products
is that the product is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold."'
Thus, it is a fundamental principle of Georgia product liability law that
"[a] manufacturer has the absolute right to have his strict liability for
injuries adjudged on the basis of the design of his own marketed product
and not that of someone else."29 After all, fairness dictates that "if the
design of [the] product has been independently altered, eliminated and
replaced by a third party after the sale and injuries then result, those
injuries cannot be traced to or be the proximate result of the manufacturer's original design which did not exist at the time of injury."298 In
other words, if the manufacturer's original design has been sufficiently
altered, "the thing being used was not the thing sold." .
In light of these principles, a plaintiffs misuse or alteration of the
product can be a complete defense to a product liability claim if the
misuse or alteration caused the injury and was not reasonably foreseeIf the degree of misuse or alteration is
able to the manufacturer."
only slight, a jury will have to determine "whether the proximate cause
of the injuries sustained was the original defective design or the
subsequent modification," but if "the original design of the manufacturer's product has been totally eliminated and replaced so that the only
similarity between the old and the new is the mere basic function to be
290. Id. at 816.
291. Id.
292. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11(bX1).
293. Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130, 135, 279 S.E.2d 264, 269 (1981)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 134-35, 279 S.E.2d at 269.
296. Id. at 135, 279 S.E.2d at 269 (internal quotation marks omitted).
297. Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 869-70, 218 S.E.2d 580, 582 (1975);
Pepper v. Selig Chem. Indus., 161 Ga. App. 548, 551, 288 S.E.2d 693, 696 (1982).
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performed, no such issue remains."' It makes sense that a substantial misuse or alteration of the product is unforeseeable and therefore an
insufficient predicate for liability to attach. To impose liability for what
is essentially a different product "would place the unrealistic burden on
manufacturers of all products which can be redesigned by consumers to
warn and instruct as to the manner in which that redesign should be
made and the resulting new product safely operated."'
A question regarding the nature of the misuse or alteration of a
product arose in one case decided during the survey period. In Dixie
Group, Inc. v. Shaw Industries Group, Inc.," Daniel Stevens sustained fatal injuries while working on a carpet wrapping machine at his
place of employment, Shaw Industries. Perpetual Machine Company
manufactured the machine in 1999, and Shaw Industries bought it from
Dixie Group as part of an asset purchase agreement in November 2003.
To protect carpet during shipping and distribution, the machine wrapped
plastic around rolls of carpet, cut and sealed the plastic with a heat seal
bar, and after a person manually tucked the excess plastic into the ends
of the rolled-up carpet, it pressed cardboard plugs into the ends of the
rolled-up carpet with pneumatically operated paddle arms. On
December 20, 2003, the operator of the machine called Stevens, who was
a maintenance technician for Shaw Industries, because the machine was
not working properly. Stevens discovered that a bolt on one of the
paddle arms had become loose. This had been happening once every
week or two (about fifty times total), and on those prior occasions
Stevens instructed the operator to press and hold a button that caused
the paddle arms to move inward and away from the machine's frame so
that there would be room for Stevens to tighten the bolt. Stevens and
the operator did the same on this occasion, but this time one of the
paddle arms swung back outward to its home position despite the fact
that the operator was still pressing the button. Stevens was pinned
between the paddle arm and the frame of the machine. Stevens' widow
sued Perpetual in strict liability and negligence, and Perpetual moved
for summary judgment on the ground that the machine had been
modified from its original design. The trial court denied Perpetual's

motion. 30 1
On appeal, Perpetual argued that the machine "was not in its 'when
sold' condition" because it had been modified in four significant
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ways.m First, the proximity switch, which was designed to prevent
the paddle arms from moving outward to their home position based on
the position of the heat seal bar, had been moved from its original
position. Perpetual's president testified that the proximity switch had
been placed in a position where the heat seal bar could hit and damage
it, and he observed black marks on the switch which suggested to him
that the heat seal bar had in fact hit and damaged the switch.
Moreover, repositioning the proximity switch changed the distance from
which it sensed the heat seal bar. Perpetual's president also testified
that he saw loose and spliced wiring in and around the proximity switch
when he inspected the machine several weeks after the incident, and
that the condition of the wiring, either alone or in combination with the
damage to the switch, caused the short circuit that caused the incident.
The second modification related to the bolt that Stevens was tightening
when he was injured. When Perpetual sold the machine, the bolt was
secured by a lock washer, but the lock washer was not there at the time
of the incident. Third, two of the three operator foot switches had been
removed. Finally, there were air leaks around the cylinders that
controlled the paddle arms and the heat seal bar, neither of which
leaked when Perpetual first sold the machine. According to Perpetual,
these modifications proximately caused the incident and Stevens'
injuries, not the machine's original design.m
The plaintiff responded that Perpetual's original design of the
interaction among the proximity switch, the heat seal bar, and the
paddle arms proximately caused the incident and her husband's death,
notwithstanding these modifications. The plaintiff presented evidence
showing that the repositioning of the proximity switch did not cause the
heat seal bar to hit and damage it because there was evidence that the
heat seal bar had hit and damaged the proximity switch while it was in
its original position, which was the reason why the proximity switch was
moved. After the proximity switch was moved, it continued to operate
as designed. As for the loosening of the bolt, the plaintiff's evidence
showed that the bolt could have become loose by the proper operation of
the machine. She also showed that the bolt could not be tightened
without a maintenance technician positioning his body in the exact
location where her husband had positioned himself at the time of the
incident. In addition, the plaintiff's expert engineer testified that there
were no maintenance problems with the machine that could have caused
the incident, and he specifically testified that the spliced wiring and
removal of the operator foot switches did not impair the operation of the
302. Id. at 461-62, 693 S.E.2d at 891-92.
303. Id.
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machine. Finally, the software controlling the paddle arms contained a
default setting that would cause them to move outward automatically to
their home position without warning even if the operator was pressing
the button, but the plaintiff presented evidence showing that the
software could have been programmed to allow the operator's commands
to override the default setting.' In light of this evidence, the Georgia
Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court and held that Perpetual was
not entitled to summary judgment because "[a] jury would be authorized
to find that the [machine] was operating as it had been designed when
sold and that the design proximately caused Daniel Stevens's fatal
injuries."3
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